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I. Towards unification 
 
Uses of pronouns 
 
It is well known that pronouns have a number of distinct uses, which fall under three 
major headings: free uses, bound uses, and anaphoric uses. Consider the sentence 
 
(1) John loves his mother. 
 
The possessive pronoun 'his' can refer back to John (anaphoric use), or to some other 
person who turns out to be salient in the conversational context (free use). As a result, 
(1) says either that John loves his own mother, or that he loves that person's mother. We 
get a bound use if we embed the sentence in a quantificational context, as in 
 
(2) Every boy is such that John loves his mother. 
 
This sentence is susceptible to both of the uses mentioned above: 'his mother' can still 
refer to John's own mother, or to the mother of someone else who turns out to be salient 
in the conversational context. But the most likely understanding of the pronoun in (2) 
corresponds to a third type of use, in which the mother at stake is not a single individual 
but, for every boy, the mother of that boy. This is the bound use, characterized by the 
fact that the value of the pronoun varies with the individuals introduced by the 
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quantifier.
1
 The bound use is similar to the anaphoric use, since in both cases there is a 
linguistic expression ('John' or 'every boy') which intuitively serves as 'antecedent' for 
the pronoun. When the antecedent is a quantifier, however, the pronoun is not assigned 
a definite value but a course of values. 
 The three types of use can be represented by indexing the pronoun and its 
possible antecedents. In bound uses, the pronoun will be co-indexed with an antecedent 
quantifier; in anaphoric uses, it will be co-indexed with a referring expression; in the 
absence of co-indexing, the pronoun will be understood as 'free'. The three readings for 
(2) can be spelled out as follows: 
 
Bound use: 
Every boy(i) is such that John(j) loves his(i) mother. 
Anaphoric use: 
Every boy(i) is such that John(j) loves his(j) mother. 
Free use: 
Every boy(i) is such that John(j) loves his(k) mother. 
 
 Of course, not every pronominal expression tolerates the three uses. For 
example, the first person pronoun 'I' is always free: except perhaps in a few exceptional 
cases, its referent comes from the context. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 
reflexive (and logophoric) pronouns are often described as not tolerating free uses. Still, 
it is unlikely that the pronouns which allow for the three types of use are merely 
ambiguous: the phenomenon is too systematic to count as a crude ambiguity. There 
obviously is something in common to the different uses — something which we must 
attempt to capture within a unified framework. 
 
Anaphoric and bound uses 
 
The first thing we notice when we attempt to unify the various uses is that pronouns are 
like variables in logic. Variables are not ambiguous, yet they have two uses: they can be 
bound by quantifiers, or they can remain free, depending on the syntactic environment 
in which they occur. With pronouns the situation is similar. A pronoun can be bound by 
a quantifier or it can be contextually assigned a value. Such a contextual assignment is 
what I call a 'free' use for a pronoun. (Many speak of a deictic use, but that is a bit too 
specific, as we shall see.) 
                                                 
1  What I am calling the ‘quantifier’ here is the quantified noun phrase ‘every boy’, not the 
quantificational determiner ‘every’. 
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 What about anaphoric uses? Can they be assimilated to either free uses or bound 
uses? They obviously have a lot in common with bound uses. First, as we have seen, 
there are pronouns which tolerate only free uses, and there are pronouns which do not 
tolerate free uses. The former tolerate neither bound nor anaphoric uses, while the latter 
tolerate both. This suggests that bound and anaphoric uses fall into the same category. 
Second, anaphoric and bound uses have this in common, that in both cases the pronoun 
depends, for its interpretation, upon an antecedent (singular term or quantifier). Free 
uses, on the other hand, are characterized by the lack of a linguistic antecedent. 
 Can we go further and provide a unified description of anaphoric and bound 
uses? Such unification can proceed in two directions, one of which seems to me more 
promising than the other. We may construe anaphoric uses as a special case of bound 
use, or bound uses as a special case of anaphoric use. I will refer to the first, less 
promising strategy as the 'binding strategy', and to the other one as the 'anaphoric 
strategy'. The anaphoric strategy will be introduced in the next sub-section. 
The most straightworward way of implementing the binding strategy proceeds 
by extending the notion of a quantifier so as to encompass singular terms as well (along 
the lines of generalized-quantifier theory).
2
 On that view the anaphoric reading is the 
special case of bound use in which the pronoun is bound by a singular term. 
Alternatively, we may extend to anaphoric pronouns in general the treatment of 
reflexive pronouns as pronouns bound by an abstraction operator. Just as the sentence 
‘John loves himself’ is analysed by means of a formula such as 
 
x [x loves x] (John) 
 
we may analyse the anaphoric pronoun 'his' as bound in 'John loves his mother', along 
the lines of: 
 
x [x loves x's mother] (John) 
 
Here 'John' may be construed as a genuine singular term, denoting an individual, rather 
than as a quantifier, denoting a function from properties to truth-values. Still, the 
pronoun 'his' is bound (by the lambda-operator).  
Whichever option we choose, the attempt to reduce anaphoric uses to bound 
uses faces a fatal objection. Sometimes the singular term from which a pronoun inherits 
its reference cannot be taken to include the pronoun in its syntactic scope. Thus the 
pronoun and its antecedent may occur in different sentences, or the antecedent may be 
                                                 
2 See e.g. Keenan and Westertahl 1997 on ‘Montagovian individuals’ as the interpretation of proper 
nouns, personal pronouns and demonstratives. 
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too deeply embedded to take scope over the pronoun. Now, whether or not we treat the 
singular term itself as a quantifier, it must take scope over the pronoun if the latter is to 
be treated as bound. It follows that the binding strategy fails: not all anaphoric uses can 
be treated as cases in which the pronoun is bound (Heim and Kratzer 1998: 241-2). 
 
The anaphoric strategy 
 
According to Frege and Russell, a quantificational statement such as 'Something grows' 
is not on a par with the sort of statement one makes when one uses a singular term. A 
ground-level statement such as 'John grows' tells us something directly about an object, 
namely, the object which the singular term stands for (John). A quantified statement 
such as 'Something grows' is a higher-level statement. It tells us that the statement-
schema 'x grows' is "sometimes true" (Russell), i.e., that at least one instance of that 
schema, obtainable by replacing the variable by a singular term referring to an object, is 
a true ground-level statement. In Frege's terms, just as the ground-level statement 'John 
grows' is about John, the higher-level statement 'Something grows' is about the property 
which the ground-level statement ascribes to John: it tells us that that property — the 
property of growing — is instantiated. 
 To be sure, it is possible to devise a quantifier which will mimick the singular 
term 'John'. Let us write it 'John*'. The higher-level statement 'John* grows' tells us that 
the schema 'x grows' results in a true statement when the variable is replaced by a name 
for John. While 'John' denotes an individual object, viz. John himself, 'John*' denotes a 
function from properties or sets of objects to truth-values, namely that function which, 
for any given set of objects or property, yields truth iff John belongs to that set or 
possesses that property. Obviously, 'John*' can substitute for 'John' everywhere salva 
veritate. But the fact that we can use 'John*' to mimick the ground-level name 'John' 
(and, perhaps, stand for it in our formal reconstruction of natural language) does not 
suppress the difference between ground-level statements and higher-level statements. It 
is from the cognitive point of view that that difference matters. We can easily imagine 
organisms endowed with the ability to make ground-level statements in the absence of 
any mastery of the higher-level apparatus; but it is not so easy to imagine the opposite 
situation, because higher-level talk presupposes ground-level talk. If we are to make 
sense of higher-level statements like 'Every man is F', we must first understand ground-
level statements such as 'This man is F'. 
 Let us apply this idea to the issue at hand. Following Evans (1977), let us 
assume that, if we are to make sense of higher-level statements like 'Every man loves 
his mother', we must first understand ground-level statements such as 'John loves his 
mother'. The former tells us that for every man y, the schema 'x loves his mother', of 
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which the latter is an instance, results is a true statement if we replace the variable by a 
name for y. Now, how are we to understand the schema itself? To do so we must fix the 
interpretation of 'his mother'. If we give the pronoun the free interpretation, the schema 
will be equivalent to 'x loves z's mother' and the higher-level statement will say that for 
every man y, 'x loves z's mother' is true if we replace 'x' by a name for y. If we give the 
pronoun the anaphoric interpretation, the schema will be equivalent to 'x loves x's 
mother' and the higher-level statement will say that for every man y, 'x loves x's mother' 
is true if we replace 'x' (on its two occurrences) by a name for y. This reading 
corresponds to the 'bound' interpretation of the pronoun. In this way we achieve an 
understanding of bound uses in terms of anaphoric uses, rather than the other way 
round. Anaphora is seen as a ground-level phenomenon, operative in sentences such as 
'John loves his mother'. If, in such a sentence, we abstract the complex predicate '()i 
loves hisi mother' and use it to form a higher-level statement by combining it with a 
quantifier, the anaphoric pronoun is automatically bound by the quantifier in the 
resulting quantified statement. Bound uses of pronouns turn out to be a reflection, at the 
higher-level, of the ground-level phenomenon of anaphora (Evans 1977). 
 
Anaphoric uses as free uses  
 
Let us admit that bound uses are best analysed in terms of anaphoric uses (rather than 
the other way round). To complete the analysis, we must clarify the relation between 
anaphoric uses and free uses. Here also there are two possible — but, this time, 
complementary — directions of analysis: we may treat anaphora as a variety of free 
use, or free uses as varieties of anaphora. 
 It is natural to consider anaphora as a variety of free use, because we 
independently need a distinction between various sorts of free use. I said that a free use 
of a pronoun refers to an object salient in the conversational context. In a first type of 
case the referent of the pronoun is given and perceptually accessible in the situation of 
utterance. This type of case is the deictic use: some object is perceptually available to 
the participants, and the speaker refers to it while, possibly, pointing to it in order to 
draw the hearer's attention to it. (If the object by itself is sufficiently salient, no pointing 
is necessary.) In a second type of case, the referent is not given in the situation of 
utterance and it cannot be pointed to. But it is cognitively accessible because the speech 
participants 'have it in mind', that is, are thinking about it or about matters with which it 
is closely associated in their memory or 'mental encyclopedia'.
3
 
                                                 
3 Geoff Nunberg gives the following example: we are walking through Versailles, and you say 
 
Gee, he certainly spared no expense. 
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 From such uses to anaphoric uses there is but a short step. If the conversation is 
about a certain object, the participants have that object in mind — simply because they 
are talking about it and, perforce, have been thinking about it in virtue of processing a 
piece of discourse about that object. A person may be cognitively salient because she 
has been mentioned in the discourse, just as she can be salient because, say, we are 
driving past the place where she lives. We end up with three basic forms, or sources, of 
salience: perceptual salience, discursive salience, and associative salience, 
corresponding to three varieties of free use. Deictic uses exploit perceptual salience; 
anaphoric uses exploit discursive salience; and uses of the third type (associative uses, 
as I will call them) exploit associative salience. 
 The prototype of a free use of a pronoun is generally considered to be the deictic 
use, where the referent is perceptually salient (see e.g. Clark 1992: 47; Bühler 1934, 
part II). The other forms of salience are seen as ersatz forms: the object is not really 
given, but we do 'as if' it was given (and use a demonstrative form) because it is given 
'in imagination' or 'in thought'. Free uses that are not deictic are therefore treated as 
etiolated or secondary deictic uses. But there is another way to look at the relation 
between the various forms of free use. We may consider the anaphoric use as 
prototypical, because it transparently reveals a central feature of the free use of 
pronouns. 
 
Free uses as anaphoric uses 
 
The central feature of free uses which makes them all anaphoric in a certain sense is not 
specific to pronouns: it is a property of singular terms in general. According to 
Strawson, who initiated this line of research and whose views have been very influential 
(see e.g. Evans 1982, Heim 1988), the use of a definite singular term presupposes 
"resources of identifying knowledge antecedently in possession of the audience" 
(Strawson 1961: 60). As he puts it, 
 
In any communication situation a hearer (an audience) is antecedently equipped 
with a certain amount of knowledge, with certain presumptions, with a certain 
range of possible current perception. There are within the scope of his knowledge 
or present perception objects which he is able in one way or another to distinguish 
for himself. (Strawson 1961: 59) 
                                                                                                                                              
 
The obvious reference here is Louis XIV, Nunberg says. Even though Louis XIV is not physically 
present, and cannot be demonstrated, he is "salient in the consciousness of the conversational 
participants" (Nunberg 1992: 294). 
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Understanding a singular term consists in linking up that singular term with the relevant 
stretch of identifying knowledge about a particular object. Following a well-established 
tradition I call such a stretch of identifying knowledge a 'mental file'. According to 
Strawson, a use of a singular term invokes a mental file in the mind of the interpreter, 
and is successful only if the interpreter actually connects the singular term with such a 
mental file, that is, only if 
 
the singular term used establishes for the hearer an identity, and the right identity, 
between the thought of what-is-being-spoken-of-by-the-speaker and the thought of 
some object already within the reach of the hearer's own knowledge, experience, 
or perception, some object, that is, which the hearer could, in one way or another, 
pick out or identify for himself, from his own resources. (Strawson 1961: 63). 
 
In this framework, the different sources of salience I mentioned above (perceptual, 
discursive, and associative salience) correspond to different bodies of identifying 
knowledge exploited by the speaker. Anaphora turns out to be a special case: the case 
where the resources brought to bear on the interpretation of a referential utterance 
consist of 'information imparted by earlier sentences in the same conversation'.
 4
 Yet 
there is a sense in which that case is prototypical and captures what is common to all 
cases. In all cases, indeed, the task of the interpreter is to find a suitable antecedent for 
the singular term (a suitable mental file). In anaphoric uses the antecedent is located in 
the previous discourse, or rather, in the mental representation resulting from the hearer's 
processing of the previous discourse. But in deictic cases also an antecedent mental file 
is invoked, corresponding to the hearer's perception of the referent. And the same thing 
holds for associative uses. 
This unification of free uses under the general heading of anaphora is quite 
apparent in Discourse Representation Theory. Kamp uses Discourse Representation 
Structures (DRSs) to stand for the mental representations formed in the process of 
interpreting a discourse, and shows how such representations get incremented as the 
discourse unfolds (see e.g. Kamp and Reyle 1993). In this theoretical endeavour, 
anaphoric relations play a crucial role. But the DRSs have been exploited also to 
represent all the information in the hearer's possession, including perceptual 
                                                 
4 "There are...many different types of resource upon which a speaker may draw or rely... He may draw 
upon what the <hearer> can be presumed to be in a position then and there to see or otherwise perceive 
for himself. He may rely upon information imparted by earlier sentences in the same conversation. He 
may rely upon information in the hearer's possession which is not derived from either of these sources." 
(Strawson 1961: 63) 
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information, insofar as it is relevant to speech understanding. It is widely assumed that 
perceptual information can be used to enter a 'discourse referent', just as discourse 
information can. A deictic use of a pronoun can therefore be considered as anaphoric on 
such a 'perceptual' discourse referent. In Heim's framework that is explicit — all 
definite NPs are said to be anaphoric.
5
 
 The notion of cognitive 'salience' can now be cashed out in terms of the degree 
of activation, or accessibility, of the antecedent mental file. Among singular terms, 
some demand that the mental file they connect with be highly accessible. There is a 
difference, in this regard, between pronouns, demonstrative phrases like 'that man', 
definite descriptions ('the man'), and proper names. Unstressed pronouns presuppose the 
highest degree of salience/accessibility. The referents of pronouns, according to Chafe 
(1974), must be in the hearer's consciousness at the time they are referred to. If the 
referent is not salient enough (if the relevant file is not currently active) it is preferable 
to use another type of expression. (See Ariel 2001 for an overview of 'accessibility 
theory'.) 
 
Deixis and anaphora: perspectives for empirical research 
 
The unification of the various types of free use, including the anaphoric use (in the strict 
sense), opens up an interesting field of investigation. In particular, it invites a 
comparative study of the tracking abilities involved in deixis and anaphora. 
 Insofar as demonstratives secure their reference via perception, we need an 
account of how perception itself can provide the appropriate grounding for deictic 
reference. As Austen Clark pointed out, such an account is bound to locate a primitive 
form of demonstrative reference in sensory processes themselves (Clark 2000). There 
is, indeed, a growing body of evidence showing that something like demonstrative 
reference takes place in vision. Pre-conceptual 'object-files' or referential 'indices' are 
used to track visual objects and gather information concerning them (Treisman and 
Gelade 1980, Treisman 1988, Pylyshyn 1989, 2000, Leslie et al. 1998). Thus Pylyshyn 
holds that "we have a mechanism that allows preconceptual tracking of a primitive 
perceptual individuality"; a mechanism that "is able to individuate and keep track of 
about five visual objects and does so without using an encoding of any of their visual 
properties" (Pylyshyn forthcoming). 
                                                 
5 This treatment, Kadmon points out, "is quite compatible with deictic uses of definites. Given that on 
Heim's approach the file is a representation of the common ground (and not merely of information 
expressed by preceding utterances), the antecedent discourse referent of a given definite NP need not be 
triggered by linguistic text" (Kadmon 2001: 78). 
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 One obvious question that arises in this area concerns the generality of the 
indexing mechanism studied by Pylyshyn and others. Is it restricted to vision, or is the 
same (or the same sort of) indexing system involved also in, say, auditory perception? 
Pylyshyn himself asks that question, but there is another one, more relevant to our 
present purposes. Is this mechanism restricted to perception, and to deixis insofar as it 
is based on perception, or can we go as far as to imagine that a similar indexing system 
may be at work in discourse processing, enabling us to keep track of about five objects 
simultaneously at the highest level of accessibility? (Think of what happens when we 
process a piece of discourse like: 'Yesterday, my brother talked to the policeman about 
the burglar we saw. He told him he thought he had escaped, but the policeman would 
not believe him, arguing that someone was awake, and he would have seen the burglar 
if he had left.') 
 Those issues are worth pursuing empirically, but only if we accept that there is a 
unified field of investigation involving both deixis and anaphora. Now this age-old 
assumption has been questioned, and the quest for unification criticized as illusory. 
According to Gareth Evans (1980), whose argument I will discuss in the second part of 
this paper, any unified treatment of deictic uses and anaphoric uses is doomed to failure. 
If anaphoric uses are like deictic uses, that is, if they are free uses, then, he says, the 
referent of an anaphoric pronoun will be determined on a pragmatic basis, by appealing 
to considerations pertaining to contextual salience etc. This is indeed what has been 
claimed by defenders of the 'pragmatic theory' of anaphora, such as Lasnik and 
Chomsky. Evans argues that any such theory has unacceptable consequences, however. 
 
II. Evans's argument against unification 
 
The structure of Evans's argument 
 
Evans' argument proceeds in two steps. First, he attempts to show that the three uses of 
pronouns cannot be unified. We are faced with a dilemma, he says. Either we account 
for the connection between bound uses and anaphoric uses (by appealing to the 
‘anaphoric strategy’), and that forces us to give up the connection between free uses and 
anaphoric uses; or we maintain that connection, and we no longer understand that 
between bound uses and anaphoric uses. The second (and less explicit) step in Evans's 
argument consists in providing a reason for choosing the first horn of the dilemma. He 
argues that the connection between bound uses and anaphoric uses is too fundamental 
to be given up. The same thing cannot be said of the connection between free uses (e.g. 
deictic uses) and anaphoric uses. Since nothing essential hinges on that connection, it 
can be dismissed if necessary. 
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 In what follows, I will be concerned only with the first step of Evans's argument. 
I do not accept the dilemma — I think we can unify the three uses of pronouns. More 
specifically, I reject the idea that, if we account for the connection between anaphoric 
uses and bound uses, we are no longer in a position to maintain the link between 
anaphoric and free uses. I will argue that we can preserve that link, appearances 
notwithstanding. 
 
The dilemma 
 
According to Evans, we must account for the fact that bound uses of pronouns occur in 
quantified statements (e.g. 'Every man loves his mother') only if anaphoric uses of the 
same pronouns occur in the same argument-places in the corresponding substitution 
instances (e.g. 'John loves his mother'). That, he says, can hardly be a coincidence. To 
account for that fact, we must acknowledge the dependency of bound uses upon 
anaphoric uses. Evans makes that dependency explicit as follows. To understand 'Every 
man loves his mother' (on the bound reading of the pronoun), two conditions must be 
satisfied: 
 
(i) we must understand substitution instances of the form ' loves his 
mother', where '' names a man and 'his' is given the anaphoric reading; 
(ii) we must understand the quantified statement as saying that such a 
ground-level statement is true whichever man we take '' to refer to. 
 
In other words, we need a general understanding of anaphora in ground-level sentences, 
and a general understanding of (universal) quantification, but that is all we need. Bound 
uses of pronouns turn out to be nothing but a higher-level reflection of the ground-level 
phenomenon of anaphora. 
 On this analysis, the pronoun does not refer in the quantified statement, since it 
is bound by the quantifier; but in each substitution instance the pronoun refers: it 
inherits the reference of its antecedent (that's what makes it anaphoric).
6
 Now we can 
state Evans's objection to the pragmatic theory of anaphora. To treat an anaphoric use as 
a free use is to treat its reference as determined on a pragmatic basis, by appealing to 
considerations pertaining to contextual salience. This theory, however, cannot apply to 
the anaphoric pronouns that feature in the substitution instances. Which contextual 
factors could possibly influence the reference of a pronoun in a substitution instance? 
                                                 
6  On Evans's approach, in contrast to Geach's, the non-referential character of bound pronouns is 
compatible with the referential character of the anaphoric pronoun in the corresponding substitution 
instances. See Evans 1977. 
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The substitution instances are not real statements: they come into the picture only in the 
semantic evaluation of the quantified statements, but from a pragmatic standpoint they 
do not exist: there is, for them, no context of utterance, since they are not uttered. The 
only context available is the context in which the quantified statement is uttered, but, at 
that level, no act of reference takes place: reference there is only at the level of 
substitution instances. 
 If we want to maintain that anaphoric uses are free uses, Evans concludes, we 
must give up the analysis of bound uses as involving anaphoric uses at the level of 
substitution instances; for no 'free' use can be found at that level. If we insist on 
maintaining the suggested analysis for bound pronouns, then we must give up the view 
that anaphoric uses are free uses. That's the dilemma. As I pointed out, Evans chooses 
to give up the connection between anaphoric uses and free uses. He construes anaphoric 
uses of pronouns (and other expressions) as referential uses characterized by the fact 
that the reference of the expression is not determined by contextual factors such as 
salience, but by a linguistic rule — the rule of anaphora. That rule applies whenever a 
singular-term position pi in a ground-level sentence is 'chained to' another singular-term 
position pj elsewhere in the sentence.
7
 The rule says that the singular term at pi refers to 
whatever the singular term at pj refers to. In virtue of the rule, an anaphoric pronoun 
inherits the reference of its antecedent, quite independent from any consideration of 
salience. Nothing prevents such a rule from applying to anaphoric pronouns in 
substitution instances. 
 
Higher-level demonstratives 
 
The difficulty which Evans raises for the pragmatic theory of anaphora can be summed 
up as follows. When I say 'Every man loves his mother' in a context C, there is no 
salient man in C to whom I refer by means of the pronoun. The pronoun ‘his’, in that 
bound use, is not referential: it is a stand-in for anaphoric pronouns at the level of 
substitution instances. At the level of substitution instances, the pronoun refers, but the 
referent which it acquires in a particular substitution instance is not available in the 
context in which the quantified statement is made. Since that is the only context 
available, Evans concludes that the reference of the pronoun is not provided by context 
but via a linguistic rule. 
                                                 
7 Evans explicitly considers the possibility that chaining may take place cross-sententially: "It requires 
only a trivial modification of the grammar to allow the chaining of singular term positions to singular 
terms which occur in other sentences [even if they are uttered by different people]. No modification of 
the referential semantics is required at all, once we allow the units processed by our semantic theory to be 
chunks of dialogue, not just single sentences" (Evans 1977: 102). 
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To dispose of Evans's argument, my strategy will be to look at a similar example 
involving a deictic use. Deictic uses of pronouns are the most uncontroversial case of 
free use. If the problematic phenomenon can be reproduced with deictic uses, then it 
cannot be used to show that anaphoric uses are not free uses. Or so I will argue. 
 Consider the following example, due to Geoff Nunberg. Gesturing toward John 
Paul II as he delivers a speech with a Polish accent (shortly after his election), I say (3): 
 
(3) He is usually an Italian, but this time they thought it wise to elect a Pole. 
 
The pronoun 'he' here is deictic: what I am pointing to in the situation of utterance (viz. 
the Pope) plays a crucial role in determining the semantic value of the pronoun. Yet the 
pronoun is not referential: I am not saying that John Paul II is usually an Italian, but, 
rather, that the Pope is usually an Italian. This is equivalent to saying that for most 
situations of a certain type, the person who is Pope in that situation is an Italian. 
 Were we to evaluate the first conjunct of (3), we would have to look down to the 
level of substitution instances and, for every relevant situation, evaluate the statement 
'he is an Italian', where 'he' refers to the person filling the role of Pope in that situation. 
This is formally similar to the case discussed by Evans. If Evans's argument goes 
through, it should go through in this case as well. With respect to (3), indeed, Evans 
might say the following. In the context C' in which the quantified statement 'He is 
usually an Italian' is made, only John-Paul II is given. The Popes of which being an 
Italian can be truly predicated only come into the picture when we consider the 
situations quantified over by 'usually', that is, they come into the picture and become 
available for reference only at the level of substitution instances. But those situations of 
evaluation in which we find referents for the pronoun are not contexts of utterance for 
either the quantified statement or the substitution instances. The former is uttered in a 
different situation (the actual situation, in which the Pope is Polish) while the latter are 
not uttered at all. Hence the reference of the pronoun 'he' in the substitution instances 
'he is an Italian' cannot be determined by context: it must be determined by a linguistic 
rule. 
 I shall start by criticizing the Evans-inspired argument as applied to the deictic 
case. This will enable me to expose a flaw in Evans's original argument, and to present 
an alternative picture of the relations between context, content and reference in the 
relevant examples. 
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Rebutting the Evans-inspired argument 
 
As applied to the deictic case, the Evans-inspired argument rests on a confusion. What 
characterizes deictic uses of pronouns is the fact that the semantic contribution (the 
'content') of the pronoun on such a use is determined by the speaker's intentions as 
externalized through his or her pointing gestures (Kaplan 1989b). That contribution 
typically is an individual to which the pronoun refers, but it need not be. What makes 
the demonstrative pronoun 'he' in (3) nonreferential is precisely the fact that its semantic 
contribution, though determined by the speaker's pointing gesture, is not an individual 
but a role, namely, the role of Pope which the demonstrated individual happens to 
instantiate. Exactly the same semantic contribution would be made if we replaced the 
pronoun by the definite description 'the Pope';
8
 but while the role in question is 
linguistically encoded by the description 'the Pope', its being contributed by the 
pronoun in (3) is determined by the speaker's intention as revealed by his pointing 
gesture. The semantic contribution of the demonstrative pronoun in (3) is therefore as 
much determined by context as it would be if the pronoun had been used to refer to 
John Paul II and say something about him (rather than about the role which he 
instantiates). Hence there is no reason to deny that the use of the pronoun in (3) is a free 
use — indeed a deictic use. 
 What about substitution instances? The pronoun in (3) is admittedly 
nonreferential, but in substitution instances it refers, according to Evans, and its 
reference cannot be determined by context. Does it not follow that, in substitution 
instances at least, the pronoun cannot be free, let alone deictic? 
 Here again, I think there is a confusion. In evaluating the first conjunct of (3), 
we proceed as follows. We consider all the situations in the relevant domain, and with 
respect to each of them we evaluate 'he is an Italian', where 'he' contributes the role 
THE_POPE. To do so we evaluate the role THE_POPE in each situation s and check 
whether the resulting value is an Italian (in s). If the answer is Yes in most situations, 
we evaluate the quantified statement as true. Speaking like Evans, we may say that the 
pronoun acquires a 'reference' (or, better, an extension) at the level of substitution 
instances. The reference in question is the value of THE_POPE in the situation relevant to 
the substitution instance at stake. Let us focus on a particular substitution instance, A, 
and call 'Oscar' the reference of the pronoun in the situation s1 relevant to A. What 
                                                 
8 I assume that a definite description 'the F' contributes a role, which can be formally represented as a 
partial function from situations to individuals. The value of the role is the object (if any) which possesses 
the property F in the relevant situation. If, in a given situation, no object, or more than one object, 
possesses the property, the function is undefined for that situation. When referentially used, descriptions 
arguably contribute the value of the role (Fauconnier 1985). 
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determines that Oscar is the reference? Is it a linguistic rule? No. The reference of the 
pronoun with respect to A is determined by two facts: (i) the fact that the pronoun 
contributes the role THE_POPE, and (ii) the fact that THE_POPE (s1) = Oscar. The first fact 
is determined by context and speaker's intentions, as we have seen. It is determined by 
the context in which the quantified statement is made. (That's the only context 
available.) The second fact is determined by features of the situation of evaluation. 
 To sum up, the pronoun in (3) is used deictically, even though its semantic 
content is general (a role) rather than singular (an individual). It is a free use, because 
the semantic contribution of the pronoun is determined by contextual factors such as the 
speaker's intention. Since the statement is quantificational rather than referential, 
evaluating it requires evaluating substitution instances, and that involves evaluating the 
role THE_POPE in various situations. If we adopt Evans's way of talking, we may say 
that the values of the role in the situations in question are what the pronoun 'refers to' in 
the substitution instances. But then we must acknowledge that the 'reference' of the 
pronoun in a given substitution instance is determined, quite normally, by the semantic 
content of the pronoun (together with facts about the situation of evaluation), which 
semantic content itself is determined by the context of the quantified statement. And the 
fact that the content of the pronoun is determined by context is sufficient to justify 
classifying the pronoun as 'free', even though the reference of the pronoun is not 
(directly) determined by context. 
 
The flaw in Evans's argument 
 
To clarify the discussion, let me introduce a handful of notions, borrowed from the 
theory of direct reference (Kaplan 1989a, Recanati 1993). A (disambiguated) 
expression is context-sensitive or context-dependent if and only if its semantic content 
depends upon, and varies with, contextual factors such as the speaker’s intention etc. 
Indexical expressions and free uses of pronouns are context-sensitive in this sense. The 
semantic content of an expression is that property of it which (i) must be grasped by 
whoever fully understands the expression, and (ii) determines the expression's 
extension. It can be represented as a (possibly partial, and possibly constant) function 
from circumstances of evaluation to extensions. The extension of a prima facie singular 
term (name, pronoun, definite description, etc.) is an individual object — the reference 
of the term. A prima facie singular term is directly referential (or 'referential', for short) 
iff its content directly fixes its extension (its reference), prior to the encounter with the 
circumstance of evaluation. Thus we may take the content of a proper name to be the 
individual it refers to, or at least to determine it directly, in such a way that the 
reference relation is 'rigid' and independent of the circumstance of evaluation. Among 
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definite singular terms, some are directly referential in this sense, while others are not. 
Thus definite descriptions, on certain uses at least, nonrigidly refer to whatever happens 
to satisfy the condition encoded by the description. The semantic content of the 
description is a role (a partial function from situations to individuals), but that role does 
not directly determine the reference of the description: the reference of the description 
(the value of the function) systematically depends upon the circumstance of evaluation 
(the argument of the function) and may shift accordingly. 
 So far, so good. Now I take Evans's argument to go through only if we assume 
that the expressions at issue (anaphoric pronouns in substitution instances such as ' 
loves his mother') are directly referential. Whenever the content of an expression is its 
reference (or fixes it directly), the definition of context-sensitivity I gave above entails 
that, if the expression is context-sensitive (i.e., if its content is determined by context), 
then its reference is determined by context. It follows that, if the reference of the 
expression is not determined by context, then its content is not determined by context 
either and the expression cannot count as 'free'. Evans precisely argues from the fact 
that the reference of certain anaphoric pronouns is not determined by context to the 
conclusion that those pronouns cannot be counted as free. But that transition is truth-
preserving only if the expressions at issue are directly referential. If they are not, the 
conclusion does not follow. Let me illustrate this by considering the case of a definite 
description. 
 Take the description 'the US President in 2023'. Let's assume that Woody Allen 
will be the US President in 2023. Then Woody Allen is the reference of the description. 
Does the reference of the description, in such a case, depend upon the context of 
utterance, as the reference of an indexical does? Certainly not. The reference depends 
upon (i) the content of the description, namely the role US_PRESIDENT_IN_2023, and (ii) 
the circumstance of evaluation (viz. the US situation in 2023). Now consider a variant 
of the example: the description 'the next US President'. Here also the reference is fixed 
by (i) the content of the description and (ii) the circumstance of evaluation. It is not 
assigned directly in the context of utterance. But in the new variant the context plays a 
role in determining the content of the description (because of the indexical 'next'): 
depending on when the description is uttered it will contribute different roles, e.g. 
US_PRESIDENT_IN_2005 or US_PRESIDENT_IN_2023. When the role which is the 
description's content depends upon the context in this fashion (instead of being encoded 
in a context-independent manner), the description can be said to be context-sensitive 
even though the reference of the description is not assigned directly in the context of 
utterance but is determined by contingent features of the situation of evaluation. 
 What I have just said is enough to show that Evans's reasoning is faulty. There 
are cases in which the content of an expression is determined in part by contextual 
  
16 
 16 
factors, even though the reference of the expression is determined only by 
circumstantial factors. Hence it will not do to argue from the fact that the reference is 
not assigned in context to the conclusion that the expression is not context-sensitive or 
(in the case of pronouns) that it is not 'free': that piece of reasoning is acceptable only if 
we assume that the expression at issue (the pronoun) is directly referential, in such a 
way that its content can't be fixed by context without its reference also being fixed by 
context. In other words, Evans's argument goes through only if we rule out a descriptive 
analysis of the pronoun's content. 
 Such a descriptive analysis is precisely what I have provided in the deictic case. 
In (3), I claimed, the pronoun contributes a role, and its content is the same as that of 
the description 'the Pope'. If that's right, and if the same thing holds when we move to 
the level of substitution instances, then the fact that the reference of the pronoun in 
substitution instances is not determined by context in no way shows that the pronoun 
itself is not free. Similarly, I think we should not rule out the following option: perhaps 
the pronoun 'his' in examples like 'Every man loves his mother' contributes a role, and 
perhaps the situation is not fundamentally different when, in the course of evaluating 
the statement, we move to the level of substitution instances. Let's assume that is the 
case. Then from the fact that the reference of the pronoun in substitution instances is not 
determined by context, it does not follow that the pronoun is not free. Evans's argument 
simply begs the question by assuming a referential analysis of anaphoric pronouns — 
an analysis which is not forced upon us simply in virtue of the fact that we want to 
analyse bound uses in terms of anaphoric uses. 
 
III. Outline of a unified theory 
 
Index vs. content: (1) deixis 
 
If what I have said is correct, there can be deixis without reference. In (3) the pronoun 
is admittedly not referential: it does not refer to an individual person like John Paul II or 
anyone else. John Paul II is demonstrated, but he is not referred to. (If he were, the 
statement would say that John Paul II is usually an Italian.) Still, the pronoun is used 
deictically. What is distinctive of deixis is not the fact that the semantic contribution of 
the pronoun (its content) is an individual singled out in the situation of utterance, but 
rather the fact that its semantic contribution is determined via its relation to something 
which is singled out in the context of utterance (Nunberg 1993). 
 Following Nunberg, let us distinguish two steps in the interpretation of an 
indexical expression. The first step is the identification of the index, i.e. an aspect of the 
situation of utterance to which the expression draws the hearer's attention and in terms 
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of which he or she can identify the expression's content. In the case of the first-person 
pronouns 'I' and 'we' the index is the speaker — the person making the utterance. In the 
case of indexicals like 'now', 'today', 'tomorrow' etc. the index is the time of utterance. 
In the case of demonstratives the index may be taken to be a place indicated by the 
speaker using his pointing finger, the direction of his gaze or any other means. (Here I 
depart from Nunberg, who thinks the index of a demonstrative is the demonstrated 
object.) 
 The second step in the interpretation is the identification of the expression's 
content (its reference, in standard cases) in terms of the index. In the case of 'I' the 
reference happens to be identical to the index, but that is a special case. The reference 
of 'we' is a group containing the index, the semantic value of 'today', similarly, is a day 
including the index, etc. 
What about demonstratives? I said that a demonstrative indexes a position in 
physical space — the position indicated by the pointing gesture. In some cases that 
position can be the semantic content of the demonstrative expression ('look there'), but 
in most cases the reference or semantic content will be something other than the 
position — for example, an object found at that position ('look at that').
 9
 Even in such 
cases the position is primary, for the reference is identified in relation to it.  Given this 
primacy of places in demonstrative reference, 'that man' can be analysed as something 
like the man who is there, where 'there' indexes a place, and the whole phrase refers to 
the man at that place (Lyons 1975: 68). 
A deictic pronoun can also contribute a property or a role, rather than an 
individual. Example (3) is a case in point. The pronoun remains deictic because it 
indexes a place in the situation of utterance and contributes something which bears a 
certain relation to that place (namely the role of Pope, which is instantiated at that very 
place by John Paul II). 
 I suggest that we apply the same sort of analysis to anaphoric and bound uses of 
pronouns. Anaphoric pronouns, I will argue, have an essential feature in common with 
deictic pronouns: In both cases, the pronoun indexes something, and its semantic 
contribution is determined in relation to the index. 
 
                                                 
9 According to Nunberg, deictic expressions such as 'here' and 'there', 'this' and 'that' lexically encode two 
sorts of information: deictic information pertaining to the index and classificatory information pertaining 
to the reference. The former is conveyed via features like proximal and distal in terms of which 'here' 
contrasts with 'there', 'this' with 'that' and 'these' with 'those'. The latter information is conveyed via 
features like gender, number and animacy and also by explicit or implicit sortals. As to the relation 
between index and reference, it is contextually determined (rather than lexically encoded, as in the case 
of pure indexicals like 'tomorrow'). 
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Index vs. content: (2) anaphora 
 
What anaphoric pronouns index is not a position in physical space (like demonstratives) 
but a position in linguistic space, namely an argument position. 
An argument position is a position in the grammatical structure of a sentence 
where an argument role is articulated. For example, in the sentence 
 
(4) Bill gave the book to Mary 
 
there are three argument positions: 
 
()i gave ()j to ()k 
 
They articulate three roles constitutive of the action (or event) of giving: the role of 
giver, the role of gift, and the role of recipient. These thematic roles can be construed as 
relations between the action described by the sentence and the entities which participate 
in the action. Following Davidson, Parsons, Higginbotham, and others, we may 
construe (4) as positing the existence of a giving event e to which Bill, the book, and 
Mary respectively stand in the relations corresponding to the three roles. 
 A number of problems arise in the theory of thematic roles. For example, it's 
still an open question whether thematic roles are universal across types of action, or 
specific to them. Do we need a specific role of 'giver', or can we manage with the 
general role of 'agent', as applied to various types of action (givings, walkings, etc.)? I 
cannot even begin to address such issues here. On the other hand there are two guiding 
principles of the theory that I would like to mention, as they are directly relevant to the 
points I want to make: 
 
Principle 1: In conjunction with the lexical semantics of the verb, the grammatical 
positions occupied by noun phrases uniquely determine the thematic roles associated 
with those noun phrases. 
 
Principle 2: A given thematic role can be articulated only once in a simple sentence 
(Fillmore 1968: 21).  
 
In virtue of Principle 1 (to be qualified later) the argument position which an 
anaphoric pronoun indexes uniquely determines a thematic role. The role may therefore 
be considered as part of what is indexed. Going further, we may be tempted to say that 
what an anaphoric pronoun indexes is less the position than the thematic role 
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articulated at that position. But nothing much hinges on the precise choice of index 
(argument position or thematic role), insofar as the position uniquely determines the 
thematic role. Hence, for the time being at least, we can indifferently talk of the position 
or the role as being indexed. 
 In virtue of Principle 2, there can be at most one entity filling a given thematic 
role in the (minimal) event described by a simple ground-level sentence.
10
 The entity in 
question may be plural: it may be, for example, a group of people. But whichever entity 
it is, that entity is the only filler of the role. The reason for that is the following. An 
entity x fills a given role r in the minimal event e described by a ground-level sentence 
S only if S ascribes x to r as its value. Now S ascribes x to r as its value only if x is 
referred to by some expression occupying a position articulating r in S. By principle 2, 
at most one position can articulate r in S. It follows that there can be at most one entity 
filling role r in e, namely the reference of the term occurring at the unique position 
articulating r in S. Thematic roles can therefore be represented not merely as relations 
between the actions (events, situations) described by the simple ground-level sentences 
and the entities which participate in them, but as functions taking those actions as 
arguments and those entities as values.
11
 
 Armed with those principles, let us consider the issue of semantic content. What 
is the semantic content of an anaphoric pronoun? Typically it will be the value of the 
indexed role, when that role is fed as argument the action described by the antecedent 
sentence.
12
 The value in question is the referent of the term occupying the indexed 
position. Thus imagine that (4) is followed by an utterance of 
 
(5) He hopes she will appreciate it. 
 
The three pronouns may be interpreted as indexing the three argument positions 
distinguished earlier in sentence (4), as follows: 
 
                                                 
10  The minimal event described by a ground-level sentence is an event type fitting the description 
provided by the sentence, such that no proper part of that event itself fits that description. See Heim 1990: 
146. By 'the event (situation, etc.) described by a ground-level sentence', I will always mean the minimal 
event (situation, etc.) described by that sentence. 
11  Notationally, I will distinguish between the two construals by using small letters for roles-as-relations 
and capital letters for roles-as-functions. Thus EXPERIENCER (e) = x: Experiencer(x, e). 
12  By 'antecedent sentence', I mean the sentence in which the indexed position is found. (This may be the 
same sentence as that in which the anaphoric pronoun occurs.) For the time being I assume that the 
antecedent sentence is a ground-level sentence. Cases in which the indexed position is occupied by a 
quantifier rather than by a referential expression will be dealt with in the next section. 
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hei hopes shek will appreciate itj 
 
Those positions uniquely determine three thematic roles in the action e1 described by 
(4), namely that of giver, that of recipient, and that of gift. The semantic value of 'he' in 
(5) will therefore be GIVER (e1) = Bill, that of 'she' will be RECIPIENT (e1) = Mary, 
and that of 'it' will be GIFT (e1) = the book.
13
 
In this way anaphoric pronouns inherit the reference of their antecedents, yet 
they do not do so in virtue of a brute 'rule of anaphora', but in virtue of being a variety 
of indexical expressions which (i) index an argument position and (ii) contribute the 
value of the thematic role articulated at that position.
14
 
 
Index vs. content: (3) Bound pronouns 
 
When the indexed position is occupied by a quantifier rather than a referential 
expression, the semantic content of the pronoun cannot be the value of the role 
articulated at the indexed position, since the antecedent sentence does not ascribe a 
particular value to that role (but only a course of values). I assume that, in such a case, 
the semantic content of the pronoun is the role itself. The pronoun is therefore 
equivalent to a definite description, as in Evans’s theory of E-type anaphora. Thus I 
distinguish two varieties of anaphora : referential anaphora, where the semantic content 
of the anaphoric pronoun is the value of the indexed role (i.e.,  where the pronoun 
inherits the reference of its antecedent); and descriptive anaphora, where the content of 
the anaphoric pronoun is the role itself. E-type anaphora is a special case of descriptive 
anaphora (see next section). 
                                                 
13 The event variable ‘e1’ is free here, in contrast to the event variable ‘e’ that is bound by an existential 
event quantifier in the logical form of both sentence (4) and sentence (5). Sentence (5) says that there is 
an eventuality e, such that e is a state of hope, and the experiencer of e is the value of the role GIVER in 
event e1 (where e1 is the minimal event described by (4)), and so on and so forth. 
14 An anonymous reader had trouble with « the suggestion that identification of the thematic role is 
instrumental in a crucial way in the identification of the reference ». « Surely », he or she says, « it is the 
classification information (as defined in note 7) together with general knowledge about presents being the 
kind of things that are appreciated ‘in virtue of which’ we are able to give the pronouns in (5) an 
antecedent or reference, downstream in the discourse to (4). » I agree, but this is consistent with what I 
say. I claim that, to understand an anaphoric expression, one has to identify its index (the relevant 
argument position/role). This is consistent with the fact that, to identify the relevant index, one often 
relies on the sort of information the reader mentions. (Similar considerations apply to demonstratives.) 
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 Bound uses of pronouns are another special case of descriptive anaphora, 
characterized by the fact that the pronoun is in the scope of the quantifier that occupies 
the indexed position. Consider, for example, sentence (6) : 
 
(6) Every mani loves hisi mother. 
 
The pronoun 'his' is not referential here: it does not inherit the reference of its 
antecedent, since its antecedent is not referential. Still it is anaphoric. What makes the 
pronoun anaphoric is the fact that it indexes an argument-position in the sentence, 
namely, the position occupied by 'every man' in surface structure. In a ground-level 
statement such as 'John loves his mother' the pronoun does the same thing: it indexes 
the argument-position occupied by the subject of the verb. The difference is that in the 
ground-level statement the argument-position is filled by a referential term, in such a 
way that the anaphoric pronoun can inherit its reference. In the higher-level statement 
the argument-position is occupied by a quantifier, so that the semantic content of the 
anaphoric pronoun can only be the role articulated at the indexed position. This  is an 
instance of descriptive anaphora. 
The role which is the content of the anaphoric pronoun in (6) is the role 
articulated at the indexed position. Since the indexed position corresponds to the subject 
of the verb ‘love’, the articulated role is that of LOVER, i.e. the experiencer in the LOVE-
relation. Sentence (6) says that for every man x, there is a state of love of which x is the 
experiencer (the LOVER) and the theme of which (the LOVEE) is the mother of the 
experiencer, i.e. the mother of x. Using definite descriptions and a standard event 
semantics, we can represent the logical form of (6) as follows: 
 
(6/D)  [Every x: man x] [e] 
(State_of_love (e) & Experiencer (x, e) 
& Theme (z: Mother of (z, y: Experiencer(y, e)), e)) 
 
 In evaluating (6), we have to look down to substitution instances of the form ' 
loves his mother', where '' names a man. What is the content of the pronoun in such a 
substitution instance? There are two possible options here. What has been said about 
ordinary instances of anaphora such as 'John loves his mother' suggests that, with 
respect to a situation in which a particular man  fills the role of lover, the anaphoric 
pronoun refers to that very man. If that is so, then the semantic content of the pronoun 
in substitution instances is the value of the role, even though the semantic content of the 
pronoun in the quantified statement is the role. To justify this shift in semantic content 
from the quantified statement to its substitution instances we might say that the 
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semantic content of an anaphoric pronoun is always the value of the role it indexes, 
unless no such value is available. In quantified statements evaluation of the role is not 
directly possible and has to wait until substitution instances are brought into the picture. 
But in the substitution instances, as in ordinary anaphoric utterances, evaluation of the 
role is possible. 
 But why should we accept the invoked principle, to the effect that the content of 
an anaphoric pronoun must be the value of the indexed role, whenever such a value is 
accessible? Is this not too rigid? Whoever is impressed by the analogy between 
anaphoric uses and free uses will be prepared to acknowledge the fact that the semantic 
content of an anaphoric pronoun, like that of a deictic pronoun, is very much up to the 
speaker. Thus I take it that, when the indexed position is occupied by a referential 
expression, the semantic content of an anaphoric pronoun may be either the value of 
the indexed role, or the role itself. This is hidden by the fact that the two readings of 
'John loves his mother' — the reading in which the content of the anaphoric pronoun is 
the role of LOVER, and the reading in which the content of the pronoun is the value of 
that role — are truth-conditionally indistinguishable in simple sentences. But we can 
reveal the ambiguity by using VP ellipsis: 
 
(7) Johni loves hisi mother, and Paul does too. 
 
On the role reading, that means that Paul too loves his (own) mother. On the value 
reading, that means that Paul too loves John's mother. 
When the anaphoric pronoun indexes a position occupied by a quantifier, as in 
(6), there is no choice: the value reading is ruled out, as the role cannot be directly 
evaluated (since the antecedent sentence does not ascribe a specific value to the role). 
Note that the same thing seems to happen in syntactic contexts in which the reflexive 
would be used: 'John loves himself' can only take the role reading, it seems, for 'John 
loves himself, and so does Paul' does not seem to be ambiguous. It cannot mean '... and 
Paul too loves John'. (I will not attempt to account for that fact, nor, more generally, for 
the behaviour of reflexives.) 
In the framework I am sketching, the anaphoric pronoun contributes a role when 
the role it indexes is not ascribed a particular value in the antecedent sentence, but in 
the other cases it may contribute either the role or the value of the role. What about 
substitution instances? Shall we say, with Evans, that the anaphoric pronoun is 
referential in substitution instances and contributes the value of the role, i.e. the entity 
which the referential antecedent refers to? We might, but I see no reason to do so. In 
evaluating a statement like (6), we look down to substitution instances in which a 
referring expression substitutes for the quantified phrase, but everything else remains 
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the same. In particular, the pronoun which we find in a given substitution instance is the 
same pronoun we find in the quantified statement, and there is no reason why it should 
not carry the same semantic content. Since, in the quantified statement, that content is a 
role, I will assume that it is a role also in the substitution instances. This creates no 
difficulty whatsoever. In evaluating (6), we look for substitution instances of the form 
' loves his mother', where '' names a man and the pronoun contributes the role of 
LOVER. To evaluate that instance we check whether the value of the role in the situation 
which the substitution instance describes, i.e. the man  who fills the role of LOVER, has 
the relevant property, i.e. is an x such that x loves the mother of x. This is  very 
straightforward. On this analysis the logical form of an arbitrary substitution instance 
(6*) is (6*/D), while for Evans it is (6*/R) : 
 
(6*)  i loves hisi mother 
(6*/D) [e] (State_of_love (e) & Experiencer (, e) 
& Theme (z: Mother of (z, y: Experiencer(y, e)), e)) 
(6*/R) [e] (State_of_love (e) & Experiencer (, e) 
& Theme (z: Mother of (z, ), e)) 
 
For Evans, the content of the pronoun in substitution instances is referential. In my 
analysis that content is descriptive. 
In section 2 I claimed that Evans’s argument goes through only if we opt for the 
referential analysis : if we choose the descriptive analysis, we may escape Evans’s 
conclusion by arguing that the content of the pronoun is determined by context even 
though its reference (its extension) is not. But the framework set up in section 3 enables 
us to escape Evans’s conclusion even if we opt for the referential analysis. In that 
framework, we draw a distinction not only between content and reference/extension, 
but also between content and index. It follows that, even if we equate the content of a 
pronoun to its reference, we can resist Evans’s conclusion that anaphoric uses are not 
free uses. Let us assume that the pronoun in substitution instances is referential, in 
accordance with (6*/R). What determines the reference of the pronoun, on this view, is 
not the context but the rule that the pronoun refers to the value of the indexed role. This 
is a new version of the ‘rule of anaphora’. Even if the reference of the pronoun is 
determined by this rule, however, we can maintain that the indexed role itself is 
determined by context. The context of the quantified statement determines the role that 
is indexed in the quantified statement and in each of its substitution instances. The fact 
that the reference of the pronoun depends upon a contextually determined index in this 
way is arguably sufficient to justify treating the pronoun as free. 
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The context-sensitivity of anaphora 
 
In the theory I have sketched anaphoric pronouns are like demonstratives and other 
indexicals. Interpreting such an expression in context is a two-step procedure which 
requires, first, identifying the index, then identifying the content in terms of the index. 
 Some indexicals have their index and their content determined in a rule-
governed manner. Thus 'tomorrow' systematically indexes the day of utterance and 
refers to the following day. In other cases (e.g. demonstratives) the index and/or the 
content heavily depend upon the intentions of the speaker. Anaphoric pronouns belong 
to this last category. Within certain constraints of accessibility, the indexed argument 
position is up to the speaker. That much is obvious. What is less obvious is that the 
content of the pronoun also depends upon the speaker's intentions, even after the index 
has been fixed. 
 As we have seen, the content of a pronoun anaphoric on a referential expression 
can be either the role articulated at the indexed position, or the value of the role. But 
that is not the only dimension of contextual variation for the content of anaphoric 
pronouns. I said that the indexed position uniquely determines a role in the situation 
described by the antecedent sentence. This should be qualified; for, in certain cases at 
least, more than one role can be associated with a given position. This generates a 
second dimension of variation for the content of an anaphoric pronoun. 
 Consider sentence (4) again: 
 
(4) Bill gave the book to Mary. 
 
I said that there are three argument positions here: 
 
()i gave ()j to ()k 
 
That is true if we disregard the noun-phrases which occupy the argument slots and 
which come to be associated with the thematic roles articulated at those positions. 
However, if we take the noun-phrases themselves into account, we see that there is at 
least one additional argument position, namely that which corresponds to the predicate 
'book' in the noun-phrase 'the book'. Each predicate, whether verbal or nominal, comes 
with one or several argument positions. What makes the argument position 
corresponding to the noun 'book' hardly noticeable in (4) is the fact that the noun-phrase 
'the book' itself occupies the second argument position of the verb, in such a way that 
the role articulated at that position (the role of GIFT) and the role corresponding to the 
noun 'book' (the role of BOOK) are co-instantiated in the event described by (4). It is as 
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if a single, complex role was articulated at the relevant position: the role of a book that 
is given. This superimposition of roles at a single position in (4) I represent as follows: 
 
()i gave ()jbook to ()k 
 
The complex role BOOK_&_GIFT articulated at position j in this example I call the 'S-
role', because it results from the joint contributions of the verb and the noun-phrase as 
they combine in the complete sentence. This is distinct both from the 'V-role' — the 
role of GIFT — which the verb itself articulates at the relevant position, and from the 'N-
role' — the role of BOOK — corresponding to the noun. 
 The coexistence of the three types of role generates a second dimension of 
contextual variation for the content of an anaphoric pronoun. In a two-sentence 
discourse like 'Three students came. They...', where the pronoun 'they' in the second 
sentence is understood as anaphoric, the pronoun can pick up either the S-role, or the V-
role, or the N-role, thus giving rise to three distinct interpretations. On the S-role 
interpretation, 'they' means something like the students who came. On the N-role 
interpretation, it means the students. On the V-role interpretation, it means the persons 
who came. 
 At this point obvious objections and counterexamples spring to mind. First, it 
may be objected that the three readings I have just mentioned are simply not available. 
Sentence (8) seems to have only one anaphoric reading, and it is the E-type reading, 
corresponding to what I have called the S-role interpretation: 
 
(8) Three students came. They were accompanied by their girlfriends. 
 
The second sentence of (8) says that the students who came were accompanied by their 
girlfriends. If the V-role interpretation was available, (8) would entail that no one came 
unaccompanied (since the second sentence, on that interpretation, would say that the 
comers were accompanied by their girlfriends). But the truth of (8) is clearly compatible 
with a situation in which many people came by themselves, unaccompanied. 
 Second objection: which interpretation is available is not a pragmatic matter (as 
I have suggested) but, to a large extent, a syntactic matter. Thus if we change the syntax 
of the example we make the V-role interpretation possible: 
 
(9) Three students came with their girlfriends. 
 
Like the pronoun 'they' in (8), the pronoun 'their' in (9) indexes the argument position 
occupied by 'three students'. But in (9) the anaphoric pronoun picks up the V-role (the 
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role of agent of the action of coming, or COMER) rather than the S-role. The sentence 
says that 'x came with x's girlfriend' is true of three students. The property it ascribes to 
the three students is the property of being a comer accompanied by the comer's 
girlfriend. 
 I grant the second point: the syntax obviously affects the possibilities of 
interpretation for the anaphoric pronoun. In (9) the quantified noun-phrase 'three 
students' binds the pronoun, in such a way that the anaphoric relation between the 
pronoun and its antecedent is confined to the formula on which the quantifier 'three 
students' operates (a formula which does not contain the noun 'student'). The N-role 
interpretation and the S-role interpretation are therefore ruled out. But in (8) the 
anaphoric pronoun 'they' is not in the scope of the quantifier 'three students', hence there 
is no such restriction: the anaphoric pronoun can point, from outside, to the S-role 
jointly contributed by the verb and the noun-phrase. This is the standard E-type reading: 
the pronoun 'they' contributes the S-role STUDENT_&_ COMER rather than merely the V-
role of COMER. 
 This leaves us with the first objection. Can the pronoun 'they' in (8) really 
contribute the N-role or the V-role, as I have claimed, or can it only contribute the S-
role, as theorists of E-type anaphora claim? Can the second sentence of (8) mean that 
the persons who came (whether or not they were students) were accompanied by their 
girlfriends, or that the students (whether or not they came) were accompanied? I tend to 
think that both interpretations are indeed available, even though I agree that they are not 
very salient. To make them visible, let me change the example while retaining its 
overall structure: 
 
(10) Three students came. Actually they were not students, but schoolchildren. 
 
(11) (Only/at most) three students came. They were too scared. 
 
I claim that in (10) the anaphoric pronoun ‘they’ contribues the role of COMER: the 
second sentence of (10) says that the persons who came were not students but 
schoolchildren. This is the V-role interpretation.
15
 I also claim that, in one possible 
interpretation for (11), the anaphoric pronoun ‘they’ picks out the role of STUDENT 
                                                 
15  As one reader pointed out, the second sentence could equally have continued (without sounding 
unacceptable) ‘and they never came, they just pretended to come’. This creates an obvious difficulty for 
my account. 
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carried by the noun in the antecedent sentence: the second sentence says that the 
students were too scared to come.
16
 This is the N-role interpretation. 
I have to admit that these examples are not fully convincing — more detailed 
investigations are obviously required. Yet I wish to maintain, tentatively, the general 
conclusion : even after a given argument position has been pragmatically selected as 
index in interpreting an anaphoric pronoun, the content of the pronoun can still vary 
according to the intentions of the speaker. The pronoun may contribute a role or the 
value of the role, and the role itself may vary to some extent.
17
 Sentences with 
anaphoric pronouns therefore display a high degree of context-sensitivity, similar to that 
displayed by sentences with demonstrative pronouns. 
 
Conclusion 
 
According to the pragmatic theory of anaphora, anaphoric uses of pronouns are free 
uses, like deictic uses and associative uses. Evans's argument against the pragmatic 
theory has been shown to rest on unargued assumptions. In the version of the pragmatic 
theory I have outlined, anaphoric uses of pronouns turn out to be very similar to deictic 
uses. Like deictic uses, anaphoric uses are ‘indexical’ in the rather strict sense discussed 
by Nunberg: their content is contextually determined in terms of some feature of the 
situation of utterance (the index). For demonstratives the index is a position in space ; 
for anaphoric pronouns, it is a position in ‘discourse space’, i.e. an argument position 
articulated in the surrounding discourse. (Not all free uses of pronouns possess that 
property of indexicality. In associative uses a content is contextually assigned to the 
pronoun directly, rather than via a two-step procedure involving an index. See Nunberg 
1993: 36-38.) 
 Besides indexicality, another thing that is arguably common to deixis and 
anaphora is what I call the context-dependence of character. The character of 'pure 
indexicals' such as 'I' or 'tomorrow' is fixed by the linguistic meaning of the expression 
                                                 
16 On another possible interpretation for (11), the pronoun ‘they’ belongs to the associative type and 
refers to the students who did not come. But I take it that there is also an interpretation in which ‘they’ 
means the students (rather than the other students). 
17 There is a third dimension of contextual variation : the situation used in evaluating a role is not always 
the situation described by the antecedent sentence. In (10), for example, the situation used in evaluating 
the role is not the situation described by the antecedent sentence but a distinct situation, namely the 
'historic' situation referred to by the speaker. (On the distinction between the  situation described by a 
sentence and the 'historic' situation referred to by the speaker, see Austin 1950, Barwise and Etchemendy 
1987, and Recanati 2000.) If the situation of evaluation was the situation described by the antecedent 
sentence, the statement made by the second sentence would be self-contradictory. 
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type. Thus the character of 'tomorrow' is the rule that a token of that expression 
(directly) refers to the day following the day of utterance. According to Kaplan, a 
demonstrative qua expression type does not possess a character. It is semantically 
incomplete and acquires a full-fledged character only when it is indexed to a contextual 
demonstration or, more simply, to a 'directing intention' which may or may not be 
externalized. On my view, the same thing holds for anaphoric pronouns. An anaphoric 
pronoun acquires a character only when its index, and possibly (some of) the additional 
parameters necessary to determine its content, have been contextually fixed.
18
 This 
point, which I can only mention in passing, is of some significance given its potential 
consequences for the structure of the theory of meaning, and especially for the division 
of labour between semantics and pragmatics. 
 A third important feature of the theory outlined in this paper is the subdivision 
of anaphoric uses into two sub-categories : referential anaphora and descriptive 
anaphora, with bound uses turning out to be nothing but a special case of descriptive 
anaphora. We wind up with the following classification, which summarizes the paper : 
 
     Free uses 
 
 
   indexical   associative 
 
 
 deictic   anaphoric 
 
 
  referential anaphora  descriptive 
        anaphora 
 
 
      unbound  bound 
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